Despite the annual publication of the Pentagon report on Chinese military power, the PLA clearly outline map of the missile's range, but have neglected the People's Liberation Army missile range increases, the enhanced mobility features. The article said that the PLA now will Xuduo aircraft missiles and their launchers Bushu in inland areas, even if the technology very powerful U.S. military can not all be to detect and lock, which gives the PLA's combat Youshi great, enough to deter Meijun Bu dare to act rashly in the Taiwan Strait conflict.
The former American Institute in Taiwan Chairman Richard Bush • Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania Journal of "Orbis" published an article evaluated the cross-strait situation. In it he called "dysfunctional politics" is not conducive to Taiwan's efforts to deal with pressing challenges, but also cautiously optimistic about the future of Taiwan made a conclusion. At the same time, Bush also deployed short-range ballistic missiles that China faced constraints. He pointed out that the Pentagon's annual report on Chinese military power is very good evidence. In last year's report on Chinese military power, the report authors did not increase its mainland China's missile deployment against Taiwan the number of assessments. In 2009 and 2010 reports, they believe that this figure should be between 1050-1150. (Taipei, spokesman for the higher number is given, they think China's missile deployment against Taiwan, the island about 1300.)
Richard • Bush pointed out that the PLA fielded an increasing number of cruise missiles. For example, in 2009-2010, an increase of about 100 cruise missiles, and this total does not include them in the number of short-range ballistic missiles. Bush also pointed out that "China's Taiwan Affairs to stop interfering in the ability of the United States is rapidly increasing," which means that the Beijing government for its strategic position relative to the future more and more satisfied with the enemy. However, the Second Artillery missile forces continue to enhance its ability to improve the accuracy of its missiles and lethal. In short, although the deployment of new short-range ballistic missiles, the PLA has slowed down, but continues to enhance its operational capability. That is, the number of weapons a force far not reflect the operational strength.
In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense report on Chinese military power is usually a clear outline of the PLA, including the missile's range map. Color-coded bar graph shows the deployment of Chinese missiles can reach the front line near the Chinese border areas. Stripe width is equal to the established missile range, this method is suitable for depicting the Second Artillery Corps, such as the new CSS-5 anti-ship ballistic missile (often referred to as DF-21D), or-to-ground ballistic missiles and other capabilities. Map shows, the deployment of anti-ship ballistic missiles along the border through the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait can, outside of combat beyond the first island chain, the Indian Ocean region. In fact, the entire Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, parts of the northern part of China now has anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) ring being threatened.
But the article points out that the Pentagon created a range of plans to a certain extent misleading, may mask subtle operational and strategic realities. Pentagon missile range plans that are located in Central China's periphery around a fixed location. In fact, these missiles may still be deployed in the inland areas, while maintaining its ability to attack important targets, both Taiwan and U.S. bases in Japan or the high seas. If the Chinese commanders to meet in the waters near Taiwan ships deterrence, then, they passed a few hundred meters inland anti-ship missile launchers will be able to do this. Or through the above two methods can be. As mobile ballistic missiles are removable and, therefore, the Second Artillery Corps can be relatively easy re-deployment of missiles. This means that increasingly flexible capabilities, the PLA can be used against Taiwan, far more than the short-range ballistic missile numbers. With the continuous improvement of Chinese weapons and hardware engineers to expand the range of the missile and combat forces, the PLA will become more flexible.
Missile units will be deployed in the inland part of the PLA commanders can benefit a lot. Concealment is one significant advantage. In the vast territory of the mobile transmitter to detect and locate the U.S. military has never been completely resolved, a challenge - during the 1991 Gulf War, in western Iraq, "Scud hunt" operations failed during the 1999 Kosovo war, Serbian ground forces almost no suffered major injury, which are to witness a disadvantage in this regard. China's changing landscape to improve the survivability of the armed forces. In addition, through extensive use of the strategic depth of China, the PLA commanders in the battle with the enemy can be an advantage. For the U.S., to send aircraft to take action against China's interior, and even ordered the U.S. Navy warship fired cruise missiles against the Chinese hinterland, which is totally different to combat coastal sites
Indeed, Beijing may deter the enemy to attack inland targets - a risky escalation of the conflict may be limited to full-scale war at sea, the cost of this war the enemy is far more than expected, the limited political objectives. PLA may use this simple expedient to prevent external intervention. It appears that Richard • Bush may understate the grudge and the Friends of the Taiwan missile threat to the country level. In addition, many scholars believe that the United States and Asia strategy, Bush used the wrong standard to measure the threat of China on Taiwan Island. With the range of the Second Artillery missile forces the expansion of Taiwan's People's Liberation Army commander may withdraw some or all of the other side of short-range ballistic missile force, but would not reduce much of the strike capability. Beijing's move could make people believe that a peaceful Taiwan Strait, but also to retain a military option (for Taiwan independence elements.) For Beijing, this is a win-win solution.